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NEW PRESIDENT
At the commencement of a new year of administra-
tion your president, your vice-president and your sec-
retary and treasurer desire to express to you our sin-
cere thanks for your confidence in our selection as
your officers.
The coming year may be a fateful one; the clouds
of war are thickening over us; as lawyers we are in-
tensely interested in whether or not there will be any
let down in the enforcement of our laws, for one of the
real tests of democracy is whether it has the capacity
to enforce the laws which are made by the people or its
representatives. A breakdown at this point would
mean a vital default. Recent months have disclosed
that the failure of France, a great democratic nation,
was not so much a military one as a collapse from
within. The people had lost that durable quality of
self discipline, and were unable to Withstand any real
aggression.
It is therefore more encumbent at this time, that
we reexamine, and where we can, improve all of the
processes of government in our state and nation.
Particularly is it important that law enforcement
agencies recognize this essential principle of govern-
ment in this democracy.
Every public official charged with any responsi-
bility of law enforcement, from the chief executive
down to the township constable, should give serious
(Continued on next page)
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concern to these days which will test our very national existence.
Even the humblest law enforcement officer may feel that the
faithful discharge of his duties not only helps to preserve peace,
and order in his community, but is a real contribution to the
cause of democracy.
The lawyers of this state can furnish leadership in this es-
sential undertaking. In every municipality and county they can
encourage cooperation with its officers to the end that we may go
forward to a higher degree of law observance and law enforce-
ment, and thus make our contribution toward the advance and
preservation of Democracy in North Dakota and in the United
States.
SEC'Y.
TAX DEEDS AND LIS PENDENS
In an action to quiet title to land where the defendant was
the assignee of a purchaser of a tax lien who had filed a lis pen-
dens, the plaintiff was the purchaser of a subsequent tax deed.
In 1926 the assignor of the defendant, purchased the land in
question at a tax sale for the delinquent taxes embracing the
years 1920 through 1924 and he made a payment for the taxes of
1925 and 1926. In November, 1928, the land was sold for the
taxes of 1927, and the plaintiff purchased the tax deeds at this
sale. In 1929 Cowels, the assignor of the defendant, filed a lis
pendens in regard to this land, and in the same month at a tax
foreclosure proceedings he received a first lien on .the property,
no mention being made about or in regard to plaintiff's tax deed.
Cowels then assigned his decree of foreclosure to the defendant.
Plaintiff became the owner of the land in 1932 by a sheriff's deed
that was subsequently recorded in 1933. Held for the plaintiff,
that the purchaser of a tax certificate does not purchase pendente
lite. "A sale for taxes is based on grounds which are adverse to
all parties to an action involving title, and which are not in any
way involved in the action, and hence the filing of a lis pendens
does not make the purchaser at a tax sale a purchaser pendente
lite." H. J. Coffin v. Old Line Life Ins. Co., 295 N. W. 884
(Neb. 1941).
This rule seems to be generally followed by the courts. Tax
liens are paramount to all other liens and the lien of the state for
taxes cannot be ousted by pending litigation. Security Trust Co.
v. Root, 72 Ohio St. 535, 74 N. E. 1077 (1905). "Tax title is not
a title of a person failing to pay taxes, but is a new title, in nature
of an independent grant from the sovereignty, extinguishing, all
former titles and liens not expressly excepted." Warren v. Black-
man, 62 S. D. 26, 250 N. W. 681 (1933). The general weight of
authority seems to be that a tax sale is based on grounds adverse
to all parties to an action. See note, Annotated Cases, 1918G 78.
BAR BRIEFS
Some courts on the other hand hold the opposite view. In an
action for ejectment, the Wisconsin court stated: "The purchaser
of a tax certificate or tax title, is not a bona fide purchaser, he
buys under the rule of caveat emptor. He takes title subject to
its infirmities. He knows that such a title grows out of proceed-
ings hostile to the real owner, by which it is sought to divest him,
in invitum, of his title, and that such a title is liable to be defeat-
ed by whatever irregularities or commissions may be in the pro-
ceedings . . . lis pendens binds both parties and privies. A pur-
chaser pendente lite is assumed to have notice of the proceedings,
because he is bound to take notice of the proceedings of the court.
Bell v. Peterson, 105 Wis. 607, 81 N. W. 279 (1899) followed in
139 Wis. 398, 121 N. W. 255 (1909). Any person purchasing land
at a sheriff's sale during the pendency of an action for the recov-
ery of the land, takes subject to the pending action. Brinkley v.
Sanford, 99 Ga. 130, 25 S. E. 32 (1896). A purchaser at a tax
sale with the knowledge of a pending action in regard to the land
in question is held to be a purchaser pendente lite. Hicks v. Port
et al., 38 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 85 S. W. 437 (1905). The Federal
Circuit Court seems to follow this same theory, holding the tax
deed void and capable of being set aside, where an action had been
commenced for the foreclosure of a mortgage and the taxes sub-
quently became delinquent, and the purchaser of such tax certifi-
cate (who afterwards received a tax deed), was brought in as a
party by the mortgagee. Cohen et al. v. Solomon et al., 66 Fed.
411 (1905). In an Iowa case where there was an action against
a city claiming assessments were irregular on a street improve-
ment project and where the land in question was sold for these
taxes, the court ruled that the tax sale was held after the action
to cancel the assessments had commenced, and that the purchaser
of the tax deed purchased pendente lite, taking the land with
constructive notice and subject to the result of the litigation.
Comstock v. City of Eagle Grove, 133 Iowa 589, 111 N. W. 51
(1907).
North Dakota has not ruled on this same problem, but the
court said in Nelson v. Kloster et al., 68 N. D. 108, 277 N. W. 390
(1928): "Under a tax deed, purchaser acquired not merely the
title of the person who had been assessed for the taxes and neg-
lected to pay them, but a new and complete title, an independent
grant from the sovereign authority and which was independent
of previous chain of title." It did not have to decide in the above
case on any question relating to lis pendens or other litigation,
but it did hold that a tax deed is a paramount deed, and therefore
from this holding it would be possible to assume that North Da-
kota would follow Nebraska in holding that any person purchas-
ing land and receiving a sheriff's deed would have a clear title,
regardless of pending litigation. The filing of a lis pendens
would be of no avail to any party in an action involving the title
to land, the burden being on them to see that the taxes were paid.
GEORGE E. SORLIE,
Former Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
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LAW BOOKS FOR SALE
Corpus Juris, Vols. 1 to 72 inclusive; Annotations, 1921 to
1941 inclusive; Northwestern Reporter, Vols. 1 to 296 inclusive.
Address inquiries to Mrs. Kathryn L. Brainard, Dickinson, N. D.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In The State of North Dakota, ex rel Alvin C. Strutz, as Attorney
General of the State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Berta E. Baker,
State Auditor of the State of North Dakota, and John Gray, State Tax Com-
missioner of the State of North Dakota, Defts., and John Gray, State Tax
Commissioner of the State of North Dakota, Deft. and Applt.
That under the constitution of this state the people have reserved to
themselves the power of initiating legislation and no such measure enacted
by a vote of the electors "shall be repealed or amended by the legislature,
except upon a yea and nay vote upon roll call of two thirds of all the mem-
bers elected to each house." Section 25 of the Constitution as amended.
That where the legislature amends and re-enacts such an initiate4
measure, the "initiative" character of the measure is not destroyed, but re-
mains in force, and any subsequent amendment of the initiated measure or
of an amended or re-enacted portion thereof is subject to the constitutional
limitation placed upon the legislature.
That Chapter 195 of the Session Laws of 1941, known as "Motor Vehicle
Fuel Tax Act of 1941" is an attempted amendment of a measure initiated and
enacted by the people; and not having received the prescribed two-thirds vote
of each house, was not adopted constitutionally, and, therefore, is not a law
of this State. Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. R. G.
McFarland, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
Morris and Burke, JJ. concur specially.
In Standard Oil Company of Indiana, a corporation, Pltf. and Respt, vs.
State Tax Commissioner of the State of North Dakota, Deft. and Applt.
That Federal excise taxes on sales of gasoline (48 Stat. 764, 26 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 2412) paid by the purchaser to the seller for payment by the latter to the
Federal Government, do not constitute part of the sales price, or "gross re-
ceipts" of sales within the purview of the State sales tax law. (Laws 1939,
Ch. 234; Laws 1937, Ch. 249).
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. F. Jansonlus,
J. The State Tax Commissioner appeals from an order of the District Court
setting aside an 'order of the State Tax Commissioner.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
In Home Owners' Loan Corporation, a corporation, Pltf. and Respt., vs.
R. L. Wright, as County Treasurer of Williams County, North Dakota, Deft.
and Applt.
That personal property taxes extended against real estate pursuant to
the provisions of chapter 242, sessions Laws, N. D. 1929, become a lien on
such real estate as of the date of the extension and entry thereof.
That the lien of personal property taxes extended against real estate Is
inferior, subsequent and subject to a mortgage placed of record against said
real estate prior to the entry of the personal property tax lien.
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That a county treasurer, after the date of the entry of a personal prop-
erty tax lien against real estate, is without authority to accept payment of
taxes on the real estate against which such entry has been made without
making collection of the personal property tax lien.
That the priority of a mortgage lien is not affected by the statute re-
quiring the county treasurer to make collection of extended personal prop-
erty taxes at the time real estate taxes are paid.
That extended personal property taxes paid by the holder of a prior
mortgage on the real estate may be recovered if paid under proper protest.
That taxes paid under protest may be recovered under the provisions
and upon the conditions prescribed by chapter 286, session laws N. D. 1931.
That the complaint in this case is examined and it is held to set forth
facts constituting a cause of action for the recovery of extended personal
property taxes paid under protest by the holder of a prior real estate
mortgage. Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Hon. John
C. Lowe, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opnion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Jalmer B. Stafney, Pltf. and Respt. vs. Standard Oil Company, a
corporation, and R. H. Dodd, Defts. and Applts.
That the occasion and circumstances under which a communication
said to be libellous is made determine whether such publication is privileged.
That a communication required to be made, and made In a proceeding-
authorized by law, is a privileged communication.
That where such privileged communication is made to a department of
the state in the discharge of a duty under express requirement of law,
such communication, if pertinent to the issue, is absolutely privileged.
That an absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which,
by reason of the occasion-, upon which it is made, no remedy can be had
in a civil action of libel.
That in the case of such an absolutely privileged communication, no
one may inquire as to whether the utterer was actuated by malice.
That where the occasion and the attending circumstances under which
such communication is made are not in dispute, the question of whether
the communication is absolutely privileged is for the court to determine.
That a communication made by an employer to the Unemployment
Compensation Division of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau of this
State, under the provisions of Chapter 232 of the Session Laws of 1937
requiring an employer to make out and deliver to the Bureau and to a dis-
charged employee a statement required by the Bureau, showing the dis-
charge of said employee and the reason therefor, is an absolutely privileged
communication when made in the manner and form required by law, and
can not be made the basis of any action for libel.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Hon. M. J.
Englert, Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In V. R. Middlemas, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Alvin C. Strutz, as Attorney
General of the State of North Dakota, Deft. and Respt.
That in order to constitute a game of chance, which is played for a
consideration, a lottery under the provision of Section 9660 Compiled Laws
of North Dakota 1913 and Section 9674al Supplement to Compiled Laws
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of North Dakota the prize or award which a player may win must be
property or an interest in property.
That the definition of personal property contained in the penal code
(sec. 10369 C. L. 1913) is sufficiently broad to include every statutory defini-
tion of personal property.
That the exclusive right to operate an amusement device is property.
That the playing of an amusement device, commonly called a pin ball
machine which is played for a consideration and which offers to the player
an opportunity, dependent chiefly upon chance, to win the right to the
extended free use of the device for periods of varying duration, is a lottery.
(Compiled Laws of North Dakota, Section 9660).
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred Jansonius,
Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J., Christianson, J. dissents.
In Sax Motor Company, a corporation, Pltf. and Respt.vs. Paul Mann,
Deft. and Applt.
That in claim and delivery proceedings, plaintiff must depend upon
the strength of his own title.
That it is error to grant a motion to set aside a verdict and to enter
judgment notwithstanding the verdict unless it clearly appears from the
whole record that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Hon. H. L Berry, Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In Erna Janssen Pltf. and Applt., vs. J. A. Kohler, Sheriff in and for
Burleigh County, North Dakota, et al Deft. and Respt.
That where evidence is properly admissible for a limited purpose, al-
though not admissible upon other issues in the case, it is not error to receive
it.
That where exemplary damages are demanded and the motives upon
which defendants acted are at issue, any evidence bearing upon motive,
including the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the information
upon which the defendants acted is properly admissible.
That where plaintiff offers herself as a witness, that is to be deemed
a consent to the examination of her attorney upon the same subject. (Sec.
7924 C. L 1913).
That where one party's witness is allowed to refer to a memorandum for
the purpose of refreshing his recollection while testifying and no foundation
Is laid to make the memorandum competent for any other purpose, and
where the memorandum is not offered by the adverse party, It is not error
to exclude it from evidence.
That It is for the jury to determine the weight which shall be given
to the uncontradicted testimony of a party to an action where there is in
the case evidence of facts and circumstances which are inconsistent with
its truth.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. 1_ G. Mc-
Farland, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
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In State of North Dakota Pltf. and Applt., vs. Otto Rasmusson, County
Auditor, Deft. and Respt.
That rights of purchasers of bonds of school districts are subject to
the provisions of statutes in effect at the time of the issuance of the bonds,
relating to detachment of territory from school districts, organization of
new school districts and the equalization of property, funds on hand and
debts between school districts which have been affected by a change in
boundaries.
That where territory is detached from one school district and organized
into a new school district, the tax levies made by the old district for debt
service do not follow the detached territory except insofar as the same may
be relevied by an arbitration board under the provisions of section 1328,
Compiled Laws of 1913.
Appeal from the District Court of Cavalier County, Hon. W. J. Kneeshaw,
Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Applt., vs. H. C. Loy et al, Deft.
and Respt.
That under the provisions of Section 8327, Compiled Laws of 1913, a
"question of the title to real property in fee or for life" may not be sub-
mitted to arbitration.
That where, in an action to quiet title the parties submit to arbitration
the only question upon which issue is joined and a decision upon that ques-
tion is determinative of title to real property, the submission is one of a
question of title to real property and void.
Appeal from the District Court of Mercer County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller,
Judge. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In Helen G. Mutschler, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That the record is examined and it is held, that plaintiff is entitled to
share in the compensation fund administered by the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau of this state.
AFFIRMED. Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, North
Dakota. Hon. R. G. McFarland, Judge.
In Northwestern Mortgage & Security Company, and Providence Wash-
ington Insurance Co., Pltfs. Applts., vs. Noel Construction Company, a
domestic corporation, and Dr. J. A. Carter, Defts. and Respts.
That chapter 174, laws 1935 which provides "that the use and operation
by a nonresident or his agent of a motor vehicle upon and over the high-
ways of the State * * shall be deemed an appointment by such nonresident
of the Commissioner of Insurance of the State * * to be his true and lawful
attorney upon whom may be served all legal processes in any action or
proceeding against him growing out of such use or operation of a motor
vehicle over the highways of the state, resulting in damages or loss to
person or property." applies only in actions or proceedings against a non-
resident. It has no application in an action or proceeding growing out of
the use or operation of a motor vehicle over and upon the highways of this
state resulting in damage or loss to person or property, where, at the time
the loss or damage is alleged to have been sustained, the owner and operator
of the motor vehicle had his legal residence or domicil in this state.
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That a domicil once existing cannot be lost by mere abandonment even
when coupled with the intent to acquire a new one, but continues until a
new one Is in fact gained.
That a person having his legal residence or domicil in this state, who
removes from the place of his domicil with the intention not to reside there
any longer and to remove to another state, is still a resident of, and has
his domicil in, this state as long as he remains in the state. His domicil in
this state continues until he acquires another domicil elsewhere.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Hon. P. G. Swenson,
Judge. Plaintiffs appeal from an order setting aside the service of summons
upon the defendant, Dr. J. A. Carter.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, Judge.
In Hilda Stelter, Respt., vs. Northern Pacific Ry. Company, et al., AppIts.
That questions of negligence and contributory negligence are questions
of fact for the jury unless the evidence is such that but one conclusion can
be reasonably drawn therefrom.
That if the evidence concerning contributory negligence is such that but
one inference can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, the matter pre-
sents a question of law to be decided by the court.
That the evidence is examined and it is held that the plaintiff's negli-
gence contributed proximately to her injury.
That where the negligence of two parties proximately contributes to the
injury of one of the parties, the one who has the last clear chance to avoid
the injury is considered solely responsible for It.
That in order for an injured party to successfully invoke the doctrine
of the last clear chance, it must appear that the party against whom recov-
ery is sought could have avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable care.
Appeal from the District Court of Grant County. Berry, J. REVERSED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
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THE 64th ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Your President attended the 64th annual meeting
of the American Bar Association as a state delegate
from North Dakota.
The meeting occurred from Sept. 29th to Oct. 3,
1941, inclusive, in Indianapolis, Ind. There were about
two thousand lawyers in attendance. This was some-
what less than what was expected, and is less than the
registered attendance at some previous meetings.
Everett E. Palmer, of our Executive Committee, and
A. R. Bergeson of Fargo also attended this meeting.
It was a notable meeting, with particular considera-
tion given to various programs involving our National
Defense. Walter P. Armstrong, a distinguished law-
yer of Memphis, Tenn., was elected President of the
Association for the ensuing year, with Harry Knight
of Pennsylvania elected as Secretary and John H.
Voorhees of South Dakota re-elected as Treasurer.
Your President also attended the 51st annual Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, with
forty-three states represented, including North Da-
kota, in attendance. Jacob M. Lashly, President of the
Association, gave an inspiring address before the Con-
ference concerning its work and its importance. He
characterized the Conference as one of the very finest
drafting bodies in the world, and paid high tribute
to the fine work that was being done in the field of
(Continued on next page)
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Aeronautics and the aid being extended in the drafting of the
new Aeronautical code covering the field of Aeronautical law.
There were also some very fine section meetings held, includ-
ing the Junior Bar Conference and the section meeting on taxa-
tion which was well attended.
It is fairly well understood that the next meeting of the
American Bar Association will occur very likely in the City of
Detroit, Michigan. It is some years ago, in 1925 I believe, since
the American Bar Association held a meeting there.
In the program of entertainment afforded visiting lawyers
was a visit to the home of James Whitcomb Riley, the Hoosier
Bard, author of "The Old Swimmin' Hole" and other poems.
HARRISON A. BRONSON, President.
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS WAIVER BY
CORPORATIONS
A corporation can speak only through its officers and agents,
and their declarations made in the course of their employment,
and relating to the immediate transaction in which they are en-
gaged, are always competent against the corporation. So thus
it would be reasonable to say 'that if a corporation can waive the
statute of limitation it would have to do so through its officers.
Where the directors of a corporation representing its entire
stock and ownership, on recovering money by litigation, turned
it over to the president to pay bills, without specifying any par-
ticular bill, and he paid the claim which was barred by the statute
of limitations, it was held that the corporation cannot recover
the payment of this claim in an action of money had and received.
The president of a corporation may be expressly authorized, or
may have authority by virtue of his being entrusted generally
with the management of the business, to pay claims, and by such
authority he may pay claims that are barred by the statute of
limitations. And in an action for money had and received the
corporation will not be successful.
Whether a corporate officer or agent is acting within the ap-
parent scope of his authority is a question of fact, and is a ques-
tion to be decided by the jury on all the evidence in the particular
instance. However, the question of authority need not be sub-
mitted to the jury where the undisputed evidence shows that the
officer or agent had general and special authority to do the acts
in question. Whether an implied authority arises from certain
facts is a question of law which should not be submitted to the
jury, but to the court. Ordinarily, authority of corporation's
agents to waive the statute of limitations will not be proved. Thus
the authority of an officer or agent of a corporation to waive the
statute of limitations rests on the principal of implied or express
agency. A president of a corporation by mere virtue of his of-
fice has no authority to waive the statute of limitations, or to
